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Planning in the
Swedish Welfare
State
ULF OLSSON
ntroduction The purpose of this article is to explain
some of the characteristics of the Swedish welfare sys-
tem as it emerged after the Second World War. It dis-
cusses the ideological background, the creation of the
instruments, and the implementation process as a sequence
beginning in the 1930s. The historical approach allows us
to understand that at crucial points in time unique cir-
cumstances were instrumental in forming the institutional
framework of the Swedish welfare system. Such an insight
should make it easier to understand the problems of reorien-
tation facing the Swedish welfare system today, when some
of its apparently fundamental prerequisites are tending to
disappear. Among these are the dominant political position
of the Social Democratic Party, the strong performance of
Swedish industry and a certain insulation from international
forces.
The Ideas It is well known that the Swedish Social Demo-
cratic Party (Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet, or SAP)
from the early 1930s established itself in a hegemonic posi-
tion in the nation and for half a century dominated the politi-
cal scene, leading all governments between 1932 and 1976.
SAP's long-term hegemony makes it unique among modern
social democratic parties.1 A cornerstone of  its  position was
the symbiotic relationship between the party and the labour
movement, centralized under its national body, the Swedish
Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen, or
LO). The bonds between the SAP and the LO were very
strong; the metaphor commonly used was that the labour
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movement had two branches, the political and the union.
Normally, all members of the unions automatically became
members of the party as well, since an active majority within
a union could collectively enroll all its members; and with
this huge membership, the SAP had a very secure financial
base. In order to understand the Swedish welfare state we
must, therefore, understand the ideological traditions that
formed the policy of the SAP.2
The state, Marx and Keynes The tradition of central planning
was already well established before the 1930s.3 The state
had, for example, borrowed heavily abroad during the
Swedish industrialization process and taken primary respon-
sibility for infrastructural investments: railways, hydro-
electric power, etc.4 Central responsibility for social policy
came naturally; the "Bismarckian" way of solving "the prob-
lem of the working class" influenced Swedish thinking, not
least among the Swedish Social Democrats, whose first pro-
gram was imported from Germany.5 This approach, social
reform through state action rather than revolution, also
meant taking responsibility for the basic functions and long-
term economic growth of the country, thereby securing the
material basis for the well-being of the working class.6
The best illustration of the reformist balance between a
liberal market tradition and the socialist tradition is the so-
called "socialization question." This was discussed during
the 1920s, but finally settled during the 1932 Party Congress
when the SAP distanced itself from massive socialization.
It was argued that socialization during the depression would
probably mean going from bad to worse. There was the
risk that a socialized economy would function even less
well than the existing one. Urgent appeals from the Socialist
International were ignored, and references made to the
Soviet Union were dismissed as irrelevant for what were
thought to be obvious reasons: "a gigantic industrialization
experiment... under party dictatorship."7 On the threshold
of entering its long hegemonic role in Swedish politics, the
SAP thus discarded much of the Marxist rhetoric in the
party program, and in fact accepted many liberal ideas.8
At the same time, however, the Marxist tradition of class
struggle remained alive as a strong demand for equalization
of economic and social conditions among the population.
Equality and redistributive justice were the parts of the so-
cial democratic ideological arsenal that were to guarantee
broad support among the population. The limits for a radi-
cally redistributive, welfare policy, however, were set by
the "liberal" responsibility for the overall function and
growth of the economy. A party that aimed to be
statsbärande, i. e. carrier of the responsibility for the state,
could not afford populist shortsightedness. Since the early
1930s, the SAP has been extremely good at pragmatically
striking the delicate balance between the two traditions:
growth and fairness or efficiency and equality.
Historical circumstances partly explain the road chosen
by the SAP. The party was defeated at the general elections
in 1928 — called the "cossack elections," because the Con-
servative Party used the Soviet Union as a warning of what
could be expected if the socialists came to power in Sweden
and concentrated much of its propaganda on proposals from
the SAP for an increased inheritance tax.9 The serious set-
back in the elections was afterwards used by the more prag-
matic and reformist fraction within the SAP to force the
party in less controversial directions.
During the depression, the introduction of Keynesianism
proved to be of great significance for the SAP. The Keynesian
"new economic policy" was a godsend to a party that was
ideologically approaching a dead end. The theory accorded
the state an active role, allowing it to use budget deficits
to pursue its  fiscal  goals.  The party now promised to im-
prove the situation for the unemployed, and could justify
its program of relief work at union wages.10
The early introduction of the "new economic policy" in
Sweden played a fundamental role for the SAP, giving it
ideological identity and a role in the country's mythology.
Although it has subsequently been shown that the policy
itself had little significance for the economic recovery of
the country, Keynesianism was for a long time credited with
having saved Sweden from severe depressions and poverty.
The Social Democrats, who were strongly associated with
the policy, were thus cast as the agents of Sweden's delivery
from the depression. The persistent emphasis that the SAP
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has put since then on keeping unemployment down has to
a large extent been a result of this legacy from the 1930s.11
The market system, as it functioned before the First
World War, was regarded as a failure. Thus, the prolonged
economic depression during the inter-war period forced
governments everywhere to look for new solutions. Many
countries ended up with corporativist or fascist systems,
others with radical socialism. In Sweden, the SAP entered
this stage, supported by strong labour unions and equipped
with a reformist program that aimed at combining full em-
ployment and economic growth with social and egalitarian
reforms. Its ideological roots were both liberal and Marxist,
to which was added a good portion of Keynesian economic
policy. Before we leave the 1930s it is, however, necessary
to add yet another less well-known element that was in-
strumental for the SAP in its ambitious program of reform
for Swedish society.
Social engineering and the Myrdals Among Swedish intel-
lectuals, the dominant philosophical tradition during the in-
terwar years was the so-called Uppsala school, with Axel
Hägerström as the best known proponent.12 This group of
philosophers criticized the idealist theory of knowledge and
the existence of absolute values as the foundation for think-
ing about society. Moral concepts, it was explained, merely
reflect their time and social carriers. This nihilistic value
theory, developed by Hägerström, opened the door for a
functionalist attitude towards society: i.e. once the direction
of change had been determined, the rational social scientist
could judge the most efficient means to use in pursuing it.
One prominent advocate of this tradition was Vilhelm
Lundstedt, a Professor of Law, who was also an active mem-
ber of the SAP and represented the party in parliament for
many years. According to Lundstedt, there existed no ab-
solute rights or duties for the members of a society. Laws
are created to serve the "public welfare" (samhällsnyttan)
— or as Lundstedt put it: the promotion of people's actual
desires — and it was "public welfare" that ought to be the
basis for interpreting the law.13
The same type of argument was used by the well known
economist Gunnar Myrdal. In 1930 Myrdal published The
political element in the development of economic theory
(Vetenskap och politik i nationalekonomien), in which he
laid bare the hidden and subjective values implicit in clas-
sical economics.14 This was a radical exercise in the tradi-
tion of Hägerström, to whom Myrdal often referred in his
writings. Two years later, Myrdal had just joined the SAP
and was formulating radical social policy for the party.15
According to Myrdal, this did not present any contradic-
tions. The "economic technician" should separate values
from facts, but once this was done it was professionally
acceptable to work in the service of a party or class. So
long as one's value premises were not concealed, it posed
no problems. Egalitarian values were, according to Myrdal,
so widely accepted in Sweden that he felt perfectly com-
fortable helping the SAP to reform society in order to in-
crease equality.
What Sweden needed, Myrdal argued, was a "prophylac-
tic" social policy. Instead of taking care of citizens who
suffer as a consequence of the weaknesses in the "social
system," the state ought to change the system so people
did not have to encounter such problems. The rational ar-
chitects of the new system were the sociologists or economists.
They would be the carriers of a new "socio-technical"
radicalism, free of "liberal conventionalism" and "Marxist
determinism," both outdated relics of the 19th century.
The social engineer can be regarded strictly as a pilot,
helping the captain to reach a certain destination, but Myrdal
obviously also wanted to give the captain of the ship some
advice about where to sail. His tendency was to let
rationality dominate over ideology:
Scientific discussion ought to be in advance of politics. It ought
to group problems even before they reach actuality and formu-
late them in a way that is intelligible to the general public.
Only thus can the scholar lead public opinion and by his in-
itiative give a realistic setting and a rational shape to political
questions as they arise. 16
Together with his wife Alva, Gunnar Myrdal became the
most influential of all Swedish social engineers. They pub-
lished widely and were active in numerous public inquiries
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into social and economic problems. Later they were to be-
come members of the Social Democratic government. In
1934, they published the highly influential On the popula-
tion crisis (Kris i befolkningsfrågan).11 Starting with a dis-
cussion of the reasons behind the declining Swedish fertility
rate, the book brought to the fore a whole range of social
problems and argued for much more active social planning.
Karl Popper makes a distinction between two types of
social engineers: the dangerous, authoritarian, Utopian or
historicist variety versus the democratic types who work
step-by-step, testing and keeping in contact with ordinary
people.18 The Myrdals would probably have described them-
selves as the latter type. They did not refer to ideology or
Utopia, only to rationality. Yet Yvonne Hirdman argues that, in
fact, this rationality, allegedly free from hidden values, was
as dangerous a basis for social engineering as any
Utopia.19 The Myrdals's declared goal was to "fundamen-
tally change different forms of human life and create
societies using knowledge as the rationale,"20 In the hands of
a strong government, such a goal could easily give birth to
very authoritarian programs.
Hirdman also demonstrates the many-sidedness of the
SAP metaphor of the 1930s, "the People's Home" (Folkhem-
met). The concept was frequently used by Per Albin
Hansson, the chair of the SAP and Prime Minister from
1932 to 1946, chiefly as a contrast to the heartless world
of market capitalism. Within a home or household, the
necessities of life are shared according to needs and not
according to the cruel principles of the market. The tradi-
tional socialist conflict between labour and capital was part-
ly replaced by the dichotomy of work versus home. The
family, the home and social policy were put in focus; this
was couched as "practical" socialism, in opposition to the
"idealistic" kind. Consumption became the important issue,
not production. This was easily combined with the Keynesian
emphasis on demand as a key factor in economic growth.
To this was added a qualitative dimension. Distinctions were
made between good consumption and bad. According to the
social engineers, patterns of good consumption had to be in-
culcated through education. There was little regard for the
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19th century reformers notions of respect for privacy. As
Alva Myrdal put it,
in the future, what people do with their money will not be
regarded as socially insignificant: what standard of housing they
have, what kind of food and clothing they buy and, above all,
whether the necessary consumption for their children is cared
for. The tendency will be towards societal organization and con-
trol, not only of the distribution of income in society, but also
of the pattern of consumption within families.
The  notion  of  "the  People's  Home,"  as  well  as  the  dis-
cussions of the demographic question and housing pro-
grams, brought women into the centre of the political scene.
For many of them, radical functionalist reforms promised
a  new and  richer  life,  while  for  others  they  represented  a
threat against well established values and family life.21
One typical feature in Swedish economic planning —
the emphasis on "socialization from the demand side" rather
than "socialization from the supply side" — can probably
be traced to the influence of the social engineers on the
Swedish Social Democrats. Social engineering also fitted
well  into the SAP arsenal  on a  more general  level.  At  the
beginning of the 1930s, the SAP was primarily looking for
short-term solutions to vexing social and economic problems.
While liberal market solutions had lost their credibility,
traditional Marxist ideologies were not popularly accepted
and were thus not very useful for a party that had taken
on responsibility for the country's economy. Keynesian
economic theory helped to fill an ideological vacuum for
the SAP. Elements from the new economic thinking could
be supplemented in a natural way by social engineering,
which was based on egalitarian values and offered a radical
social policy that included rational planning and growth of
the public sector. Towards the end of the decade, the Social
Democrats were thus equipped with a range of planning
ideas, which included liberal and Marxist elements, enlarged
by Keynesian theories on economic policy, and arguments
in favour of active social engineering.
The Instruments The realities of the 1930s required that
earlier socialist and radical ideas be forged into a body of
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concrete goals for a Social Democratic policy. Most of these
plans, however, could not be immediately implemented.
Concrete plans for reforms had been developed in many
cases, but the tools of implementation were still lacking.
The existing state bureaucracy was too small and too con-
servative to be really useful. It took the Second World War
to remove most of these restrictions.
The war generated a strong feeling of common interest
and national unity. A coalition government was formed in
1940, which included the SAP and the three non-socialist
parties. For many Swedes, Social Democracy became the
safe haven between the radical ideologies of left and right.
After the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty and the Soviet attack
on Finland in December 1939, the Swedish Communist
Party was isolated and politically crippled for several years.
No fascist or nazi party managed to win seats in the par-
liament. Per Albin Hansson became a unifying symbol for
the country's cautious and pragmatic policy of neutrality.
During the war, representatives from all parties of the
government marched together in the traditional socialist
parade on the First of May, the red standards mixed with
the yellow and blue of the Swedish flag. In 1940 the SAP
received nearly 54 percent of the total votes in the general
elections. The party had become the main vehicle of national
unity, a genuine statsbärande party.
In Sweden, as in countries directly involved in the war,
an emergency administration was given responsibility for
the wartime economy. The goal was to secure resources for
the country's defense and to guarantee a fair distribution
of  the  necessities  of  life.  A  new  Ministry  of  Supply
(Folkhushållningsdepartementet) was created and the emer-
gency administration was effectively put under the direct
control of the government. The existing, but ill-fated, emer-
gency bureaucracy from the First World War was to a great
extent ignored. A group of primary emergency bodies for
different fields were set up. Some of these were subordinate
to the Ministry of Supply, others were under regular depart-
ments. To the former belonged the important Food Com-
mission, the Industrial Commission, the Price Control
Board, the Fuel Commission and the Transport Commission.
A subgroup of secondary bodies was formed under this
level, not reporting directly to the government, but to the
"commission level." In addition, a large and flexible group
of between 20,000 and 25,000 local and regional bodies
was established, which worked closely together with busi-
ness and citizens. If the sub-local bodies, often one-person
operations, are included, there were more than 100,000
agencies.22 Sweden during these years has been charac-
terized as
a society thoroughly regulated by emergency bodies, (with) the
orientation of these bodies towards both specialization and
cooperation, the organizational flexibility built into the ad-
ministrative apparatus and the informal operating procedures of
the emergency bodies as an expression of a new administrative
efficiency. 23
Another characteristic feature was the centralization of
decision-making. Traditional municipal self-government
was more or less abolished when it came to emergency
regulation. Typically, corporatist organizations and interest
groups of different kinds were brought into the system where
they  were  assigned  the  status  of  semi-official  bodies.  Of
course, the tradition of working closely together with such
bodies was already well-established within the SAP. As a
part of the labour movement, it had considerable experience
in working with the unions. The Swedish Employers' Con-
federation, SAF, and the Swedish Confederation of Trade
Unions, LO, in 1938 signed the notorious Saltsjöbaden
agreement, which gave these national organizations a com-
pletely dominant position in negotiating wages and other
conditions on behalf of workers. This tendency to con-
centrate powers in the hands of the national leadership
manifested itself again in 1941 when the LO was given the
power to settle jurisdictional disputes among its members
and to make changes in the organization of its affiliates.
The agrarian policy developed during the 1930s was
based on a collaboration not only with the Agrarian Party,
but also the farmers' movement, a "popular movement" with
great similarities to the trade union movement. Just before
the outbreak of the war, the government invited repre-
154 155
Studies in Political Economy Olsson/Swedish Planning
sentatives of the national organizations for trade and in-
dustry to discuss collective agreements along these lines.
During the war, control of prices and wages was successful
thanks to agreements between the governments and all these
central organizations.
The increasing concentration on - and penetration by -
national organizations during the war thus went hand in
hand with a closer integration between these organizations
and the government. The latter, having started to take a
firmer political grip of the state during the 1930s, now used
the emergency situation to strengthen this hold, while at
the same time the state took tighter control over the whole
society with the help of the new administrative system.
The basis for the emergency administration was a number
of new laws that put the state in complete command of all
resources, production, foreign trade and the financial sector.
This emergency legislation was only gradually eliminated
after the war and was to a large extent still in force at the
end of the 1940s. The foreign exchange controls introduced
in 1939 remained for half a century as the foundation of
Swedish economic policy, a policy that differed significantly
from that of other countries.
The SAP gained valuable experience during the five years
of war and became comfortable with the role of statsbärande
party. In contrast to many other European countries, there
was in Sweden no disruption in the political situation during
or after  the war.  The political  system and the bearers  of
state authority remained the same. Nor did Sweden's posi-
tion as a neutral country change much when the war ended.
By not joining either of the two Cold War blocs, Sweden
remained politically isolated. A certain independence also
characterized the approach to economic and social policy:
Sweden was inclined to look for its own solutions.
It is important to underline this continuity between the
1930s and the postwar period. Many of those who developed
the planning philosophy before the war also took part in
building up the administrative capacity during the war, and
were finally prepared to implement the programs after the
war. The difference between Swedish postwar planning and
the planning that took place in other countries was, there-
fore, mainly a result of specific circumstances during the
1930s. The war created an opportunity to devise the neces-
sary instruments; the continuity within the social and politi-
cal structure together with Sweden's relative isolation,
explains much of what happened from the 1950s onwards.
The Implementation As a preparation for peace, the Social
Democrats worked out a new party program in 1944, in
which the ideas of a planned economy played an prominent
role. Ernst Wigforss, Minister of Finance and leading party
ideologist, was the main architect of this work. The SAP
also published "The Labour Movement's Postwar Program."
This report was built on the clear assumption that the ad-
ministrative system from the emergency years should remain
in place in peacetime.24 The basic goals were full employ-
ment, a fair distribution of wealth, and economic democracy.
Some of the proposals were very radical, for example the
establishment of a large state commercial bank, socialization
of the insurance companies, public investment control, and
socialization of certain industries to achieve more effective
production. Most significant for the future were the plans
for the construction of a comprehensive welfare system.
As the SAP's program took shape, the Commission for
Postwar Planning, led by Gunnar Myrdal, was simultaneous-
ly publishing its recommendations for the years to come.
Here, the theoretical foundations for a postwar economic
policy were developed from the thinking of the 1930s, but
the Commission went further and presented a theoretically
consistent model for what it regarded as rational use of the
nation's resources. The Commission also suggested a series
of radical steps to cope with the expected postwar depres-
sion.
The years 1944-1945 mark the culmination of the plan-
ning philosophy within the SAP. The political climate all
over Europe had swung to the left. In the 1944 general
elections, the Swedish Communist Party secured 10 percent
of the total votes, which increased their representation in
the 230 seat Second Chamber from three to fifteen. Union
expectations were high: wages had been frozen for several
years and there had been a shortage of many commodities.
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The time had now come to compensate for the lean years,
Myrdal, who became Minister of Trade in the purely Social
Democratic government that took power in July 1945,
coined the catch-phrase of the day: "Harvest Time."
The new government had a wide range of tasks and a
variety of programs to choose from for the economic and
welfare policy offensive of the ensuing decades. Admittedly,
the  SAP  was  for  a  time  forced  on  the  defensive  both  by
domestic political circumstances and by international
economic developments.25 The initial push for postwar plan-
ning was thus checked, but less so in Sweden than else-
where. So much of the agenda was already set at the end
of the war.  The SAP had a strong political  base and was
able to persevere, so that two decades later Sweden had
the largest public sector of all comparable countries and
probably the most comprehensive "cradle to grave" system
of social security. Although the export industries success-
fully exploited foreign demand, Sweden did not benefit from
any extraordinary economic growth during these years; what
was extraordinary was the fact that growth, to a large extent,
was directed towards the public sector.26
The expansion of the Swedish welfare state cannot be
explained simply by a generally increasing demand for
public welfare in a growing economy. Instead, the demand
for social security was transformed through the already es-
tablished political system into specifically Swedish, often
centralized and uniform, institutions. These institutions
produced public welfare goods while market alternatives
were precluded or effectively eliminated. It is these in-
stitutional arrangements which give the Swedish welfare
profile its distinction, rather than Keynesian economic
policy, which was adopted, after the war, in virtually every
Western industrialized nation.
Gunnar Myrdal argued in 1932 that there was much scope
for an active social policy in Sweden since the country had
an unusually low level of taxation.27 By that time public
spending, which roughly equaled tax revenues, amounted
to about 20 percent of the GDP. Following the outbreak of
the Second World War, the percentage increased erratically
and, after 1945, grew steadily for many decades. During
the 1960s, public sector growth in Sweden was more rapid
than in most comparable countries, and it reached two-thirds
of GDP in the 1980s. More than a third of public expenditure
consisted of transfer payments to households, with the aim
being to channel consumption in certain directions and to
equalize living standards. Almost half of public expenditure
came in the form of direct public consumption, i.e. educa-
tion and social services.28
There  is  no  perfect  correlation  between  a  large  public
sector and a highly planned economy. In Sweden, however,
the socio-political foundations of the welfare society were
laid when the Second World War ended, and the quantitative
growth in the public sector no doubt reflects the completion
of the project.29 It would be impossible to describe - let
alone analyze - in this short space the vast complex of
postwar economic planning in the Swedish welfare state.
It is useful, however, to focus on one example, in this case
housing policy, to illustrate the typically Swedish approach
to planning.
Housing policy - a case of planning More attention has
probably been paid by politicians to housing than any other
sector of the modern Swedish economy. The foundations
were laid during the early 1930s, when most of the earlier
attempts at influencing the housing situation were aban-
doned and a new start was made. At this time, there was
no clear housing philosophy within the SAP, which was
more or less paralyzed by internal controversies: the radical
wing advocated large-scale, state-socialist solutions to the
housing problem, while the moderate wing preferred small-
scale, cooperative housing projects in accordance with syn-
dicalist or guild socialist traditions. For the latter, one house
per family was preferred; blocks of flats were associated
with traditional dependency on landlords, overcrowding and
low standards. All Social Democrats agreed, however, that
market forces were unable to solve the country's problems;
the private housing market was "a paradise for wolves and
jackals."30
This period of paralysis ended in 1932 with the social
democrats embrace of countercyclical fiscal policy. As part
of an expansionist fiscal policy, a housing program was
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ideal: it employed many workers per invested krona and it
required few imports. Politically, the improvement of hous-
ing conditions for the population was easy to defend. Of
the total amount of money reserved for the labour market
policy in the 1933 state budget, one-quarter was set aside
for housing.31
The 1933 housing program had both an immediate and
a long-term ideological impact. A Social Housing Commis-
sion (Bostadssociala utredningen) started to work in the
same year, but exerted considerable influence long after the
war. Alf Johansson, a leading economist, was appointed
secretary. He belonged to the new Stockholm School and
was, with the exception of Gunnar Myrdal, the most in-
fluential economic theorist of the many involved in the
development of a social democratic planning philosophy.
For Johansson, it was natural to give housing a prominent
role in economic policy, not only as a major countercyclical
instrument during the 1930s, but also later, when the issue
became a matter of "fine-tuning" rather than a fight against
economic depressions. This was extremely important for con-
struction workers since the building industry is notoriously
vulnerable to market fluctuations. The Construction Workers'
Federation, therefore, took a very active part in forming
housing policy right from the start.
During the 1930s housing policy was also intimately con-
nected with the "demographic issue." Falling fertility and
the prospect of a decrease in total population were worrying to
the Swedes. An active housing policy was seen as part of a
solution. Overcrowded and unsanitary houses created social
problems,  and,  it  was  argued,  a  natural  way  for  people  to
mitigate the effect of these problems was to avoid having too
many children. This was seen to be a typical failure of the
social system, which ought to be corrected. Since the
"demographic issue" was regarded as important by most
people, it was possible to get wide support for several (albeit
limited) measures to improve the housing situation, such as
subsidizing old-age pensioners and families with many
children.
A "prophylactic" social policy aimed higher, however. As
the Myrdals put it in On the population crisis
160
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... the goal for housing policy ... should be an apartment that
in addition to a kitchen and one room for the parents includes
one room for the boys and one room for the girls. This means
that a family apartment should consist of at least three rooms
and a kitchen.32
It was obvious that such a Utopian improvement could
not become reality without heavy state subsidies.33
The outbreak of the war meant that the housing program
was integrated into the overall emergency planning effort. In
1942, rent control was introduced, and it was still in effect
half a century later, albeit in modified form. Since the
Second World War, the rule of thumb has been that
workers should pay 20 percent of their income as rent for a
modem apartment, consisting of two rooms and a kitchen. A
new system for the financing of house-building was also
introduced, whereby very generous state credits were given for
the construction of non-profit housing. Since then, public and
co-operative organizations have dominated the Swedish
housing sector.
In the SAP postwar program, ambitious plans for meeting the
need for high quality housing were presented, and the goal
was fixed in quantitative terms. In 1946 a Fifteen Year Program
was adopted, based on a calculation which included population
growth, household formation practice and a set goal of two
rooms and a kitchen for a family consisting of two adults and
two children. Certain standards of space and quality were also
set.
To achieve these goals within 15 years, detailed planning and
considerable subsidies were necessary. After some discussion,
the  SAP  chose  a  rather  radical  policy.  There  was  to  be  a
concentration on the building of large blocks of flats. This
choice was supported by radical architects, influenced by the
collectivist ideas of Lewis Mumford and others, who had been
active in the second Social Housing Committee.34 Detached
houses and co-operatively or privately built and owned houses
were discriminated against. The concentration on blocks of flats
for rent had an ideological side to it, but also a practical one:
substantial demand for privately-owned flats was unlikely, and
generous rent
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allowances to create a demand for rented flats offered
greater opportunities.
To  be  able  to  use  the  communities  as  instruments  for
housing policy, the SAP in 1946-1948 succeeded in getting
the parliament to change the Local Authority Law of 1862.
Under the new regulations, the local authorities which had
already been put in charge of distributing state loans for
housing construction during the war) could decide the
"where, when, what and by whom" for all building
projects.35 The new position of the local authorities was
now confirmed: they were given the monopoly of planning
and the building sector became a part of the political system.
Housing agencies were formed on the county, as well as
local level. The Social Democrats normally dominated the
other organizations that were formed by groups involved
in the housing program: the Construction Workers Federa-
tion, the National Tenants' Association, the trade-union
owned National Builders Association, the Association of
Tenants' Savings and Building Societies, the Public Utility
Housing Enterprises and so on. The public housing sector
was soon managed by this corporativist network of organiza-
tions, held together by their loyalty to SAP.
Apartments were distributed by community agencies,
with whom all vacant apartments, both publicly and private-
ly-owned, had to be registered. It was declared a "social
right" (social rättighet) to have a decent place to live; and,
in principle, need, not the ability to pay, was to decide the
distribution of housing. Communities were encouraged to
form non-profit "public utility" building associations, which
were dominated by politically elected boards. In expanding
industrial and urban regions, where the SAP normally
dominated, non-profit builders were much favoured. The
number of finished flats increased quickly from about
40,000 per year at the beginning of the 1950s to about
80,000 per year in the middle of the 1960s. They were all
built according to central regulations that guaranteed a cer-
tain standard and equipment, and more than two-thirds of
them were in blocks of flats. These results could not have
been reached without the support of national economic
policy and a strict control of the capital market. Credit was
directed towards the housing sector by the Bank of Sweden,
which forced the commercial banks to satisfy the housing
industry's need for long-term credit ahead of other sectors.
Despite the achievements, by the beginning of the 1960s
it became clear that the goal set 15 years earlier could not
be reached. Though the number of apartments had increased
by 700,000, households were still overcrowded and a third
of all apartments lacked the required modern conveniences.
As a result of rapid structural changes in the Swedish
economy during the 1960s, the demand for housing had
become more pronounced. Having made housing a political
issue, the government was put under pressure to accelerate
the pace of construction. The result was the Million Pro-
gram, under which 100,000 apartments were built per year
between 1965 and 1974. This meant an annual growth rate
of three percent, an impressive figure made possible by
large-scale, industrial construction techniques including
prefabrication and the use of new materials.
During the 1970s, the construction of new houses
diminished, partly as the combined effect of a slow-down
in economic growth, less internal migration and rising build-
ing costs. By this time, however, the Swedish housing situa-
tion was probably, from an egalitarian point of view, better
than in any other country. Yet something had changed in
the post-1974 evolution of policy. It was still clear that the
state should set the overall goal for the quantity and quality
of house construction and allocate the necessary resources,
including subsidized loans. It was also still clear that the
consumption of all housing should be publicly regulated
and that all residents earning less than a certain income
should receive rent allowances. But, and this was the new
feature, increases in space and equipment above the set basic
level could be determined by individual choice. The par-
liament shifted from
A continued increase in the standard of housing determined by
collective choice in conjunction with subsidies at all levels of
consumption...[to]...A continued increase in the standard of
housing determined by individual choice in conjunction with
subsidies at all levels of consumption.36
162 163
Studies in Political Economy Olsson/Swedish Planning
This decision reflected the fact that the coalition of
popular movements no longer dominated Swedish housing
and building policy, as completely as before. This coalition,
including the LO and the SAP, had provided the basis of
political support for the strictly planned housing policy of
the immediate postwar period. Against this coalition stood
a weaker coalition with connections to private business. It
was not until the 1970s that the political situation changed
in such a way that the 30-year old tradition was partly
broken and more liberal principles were introduced. Despite
these changes, all apartments are still in principle publicly
distributed, rents are regulated, and the rent allowance to
tenants is one of the largest transfer items in the Swedish
public budget. Total support for housing amounted to close
to 4 percent of GNP during the 1980s.
The Swedish postwar housing program has been called
a "success story."37 A more balanced view must, however,
incorporate some of the criticisms that have been levelled
against it. Economically, it has been argued that it was un-
productive to devote so many resources to one sector of
the national economy. Other fields, such as trade and in-
dustry, have been affected by this uneven distribution and
sometimes lacked capital and labour. Existing regulations
are also blamed for creating a situation in which the existing
housing facilities were used less effectively than might be
the case with a freer market system. Finally, the forced and
industrialized housing programs of the 1960s and 1970s
evinced little regard for construction traditions and aesthetic
values. City centers were demolished and large-scale,
anonymous residential blocks, where social problems soon
concentrated, replaced them.
Many more examples of the distinctive approach to the
implementation of welfare programs might be detailed. One
of the most well-known Swedish programs is the active
labour market policy developed in the late 1950s. While
the policy is recognized as an essential element of the
Swedish welfare state, what many observers may be less
well aware of is the way the new Labour Market Board
(Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, or  AMS)  was  staffed.  In  much
of the Swedish civil service, formal qualifications constitute
the basis for recruitment. In this case, however, practical
experience, general aptitude, and a positive attitude towards
the goals of the organization were explicitly emphasized,
which meant that Social Democrats and active members of
the unions were often chosen. The General Directors and
other top officials were normally active social democrats.
Promotion within the AMS administration was also uncon-
ventional, without the traditional respect for seniority etc;
people were hand-picked for internal advancement. The
local as well as the central unions were regularly engaged
in the "socialization" of the AMS personnel. A flexible and
loyal organization enjoying legitimacy among the workers
was created through this "cadre" recruitment policy, in a
conscious effort to break the ill-fated tradition established
by the conservative unemployment agency of the interwar
period.38 Both the housing and the labour market policies
illustrate the possibilities existing for innovative social
democrats as long as their programs met the classic
qualifications: the promotion of growth, the satisfaction of
union interests, and the furtherance of economic and social
equality.
Conclusion Some recent changes in the underlying foun-
dations of the Swedish welfare model may lead to a wither-
ing away of the distinctiveness of the Swedish welfare
profile. The first of these changes has to do with the
statsbärande character of the Social Democratic Party. The
Swedish welfare state was built up in a democratic and
parliamentary manner. Nevertheless, there have been ele-
ments in the process that remind us of the "mobilization"
strategies used in nations where only one party is allowed.
In the examples described above we observe that not only
was administrative skill demonstrated in implementing the
programs, but that some attention was paid to ensuring that
different organizations and popular movements as well as
personnel were ideologically committed to these programs.
The SAP was not just one (albeit larger) political party among
others. It was woven into the very fabric of the society.
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Swedes have organized themselves in so-called popular
movements, studying or working for their varied collective
interests, and SAP members have been frequently found in
the leading cadre of such organizations. But this old type
of popular movement, rooted in the social changes of the
19th century, has gradually lost its role in Swedish society.
The younger generation is committed (if at all) to other
tasks. The modern "people's movements," such as Green-
peace, Amnesty International, and so on, have no natural
connection with the Social Democratic party. They are
single issue movements that mesh poorly with the estab-
lished party structure.
The statsbärande character of the SAP has also dimi-
nished as a result of its weaker position in parliament. The
1976-1982 period of non-socialist government did not fun-
damentally change politics, but the notion of the SAP as
the only conceivable ruling party was obviously affected.
Since 1982, the party has not been able to form a parliamen-
tary majority of its own, which has forced it into many
compromises and a subsequent loss of identity.
The  party's  close  attachment  to  the  LO  has  also  become  a
somewhat less valuable asset. From having been able to
count on three-quarters of the workers' votes in the national
elections, the SAP cannot be sure of much more than half
to-day. There are also signs of a decreasing rate of unioniza-
tion, associated, in part, with the growth of the "postin-
dustrial" private sector. Finally, party membership in the
SAP declined by roughly ten percent during the 1980s. A
reasonable prediction is that this will further decline with
the termination of collective union membership in the party.
The second long-term change concerns Sweden's recent
economic performance. The strength of the Swedish welfare
model has been its ability to combine social security and
an egalitarian distribution of income with significant economic
growth. Sweden started from an advantageous position after
the war and could exploit unparalleled growth in the inter-
national economy for more than two decades. A rapid struc-
tural change in Swedish society, including the early addition of
married women to the labour force, gave further growth
potential. However, since the early 1970s, GDP per capita
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has been rising at a markedly slower rate in Sweden than in
most OECD economies.39 It  has  gradually  become  clear  to
most Swedish citizens that the country is steadily losing
ground when standards of living are compared with other
countries. Qualified blue collar workers and salaried em-
ployees have found that their European counterparts enjoy a
higher level of private consumption, while at the same
time their social benefits are also often fully comparable.
As a result, there has been an aggravated and openly ex-
posed tension within the social democratic party, sometimes
referred to as "the war of the roses," with one side arguing
for more of a "Marxist," egalitarian and traditional SAP
policy and the other for a more liberal and growth-oriented
policy. The dividing line between the two camps is to some
extent congruent with the border between publicly and
privately employed, mainly industrial, workers. Since the
1970s, the union of local government employees has dis-
placed the metal workers as Sweden's largest union.
These challenges to the Swedish welfare model are, in a
way,  the  result  of  its  very  accomplishments.  In  the  social
security field, comprehensive systems have been built up to
such an extent that they sometimes have reached a saturation
point. Many conservative SAP voters still demand new and
costly welfare reforms, but with a public sector covering almost
two-thirds of the nation's total production and the highest rate
of taxation in the OECD, it is hard to proceed with further
expansion of the system. Increasingly, interest has focussed
on public sector productivity, rather than growth and this
has occasioned debate about the efficacy of public monopoly
of welfare production. In this connection, a "decentralization
wave" has passed through the administrative systems,
resulting in the erosion of centralist traditions. In an attempt to
curb inflation, wage-formation has also gradually become more
decentralized. The Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF)
and the LO used to agree on the framework within which
different unions and industries negotiated wages. The
necessary discipline for such a system has, however, broken
down and, since the 1970s, the employers' organizations do not
find it useful or possible
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to negotiate on a national level, a development which has
weakened the position of the LO as well.
The third important tendency is the internationalization of
Swedish society. At the end of the Second World War,
Sweden was a comparatively isolated country. This is some-
thing of a paradox, since its industry was export-oriented
and Swedish politicians assumed an active role abroad. As a
result of its official neutrality, however, Sweden has had
little to do with other European nations politically. The SAP
has tended to maintain contact with social democratic move-
ments abroad rather than with foreign governments as such.
Since no other social democratic party has enjoyed such a
long term in office as in Sweden diplomatic relations with
the European states remained relatively formal. The SAP
did not find it worthwhile to look to a mainly conservative
Europe for inspiration with respect to economic or welfare
policy. Connections to developing countries or more radical
governments, whether directly or via the United Nations,
have tended to overshadow contacts with closer neighbours.
The integration of an economically vitalized Europe has,
however, forced Sweden to revise its outlook. Sweden must
now harmonize its policies in many areas to gain or maintain
access to other markets. The recent loosening-up of the
political blocs has also reduced the barriers between Sweden
and its European neighbours. Such developments will
probably also reduce differences in economic policy.
The margins for Swedish welfare policy have recently
narrowed for yet another reason: the country has been forced
to abandon foreign exchange controls after half a century,
another result of the ongoing internationalization of the
economic system. Since 1939, this legislation insulated the
Swedish economy and made it possible to pursue an
economic policy which diverged from that of other
countries. Today, however, capital can easily move out of
the country and already there have been signs of an in-
dustrial exodus from Sweden. Swedish companies are to a
large extent multinational and practically all growth in their
industrial employment now takes place abroad. More than
half of the employees of the 20 largest industrial companies
work outside Sweden. Moreover, there is no corresponding
direct  foreign  investment  taking  place  in  Sweden,  a  fact
which is contributing to the erosion of the domestic in-
dustrial base. This development is partly motivated by the
high cost of labour in Sweden, in turn partly a result of
the generous welfare system.
It has been argued in this paper that the SAP`s hegemony,
the strong industrial base and relative national isolation were
three important prerequisites for the creation of the Swedish
planning and welfare system, the foundations of which were
formed during the 1930s and 1940s. The gradual erosion
of the SAP`s hegemony, Sweden's recent relatively weak
economic performance, and internationalization are three
tendencies that may lead to alterations in the Swedish plan-
ning and welfare system and ultimately, may entail the loss
of its characteristic profile.
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